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We test whether predictions of the Aghion and Howitt (2004) model are 
supported  by  firm  level  data.  In  particular,  we  analyze  if  there  is  an 
inverted U-shaped relation between competition and R&D. Results show 
that the inverted U-shaped relation is supported by the Herfindahl index but 
not by the price cost margin. Using the Herfindahl index results suggest 
that  breaking  up  monopolies  increases  R&D  while  further  increases  in 
competition  most  likely  leads  to  reduced  R&D.  Comparing  different 
estimators, we find that time-series based estimators typically result in less 
clear-cut  results,  probably  driven  by  a  lack  of  time  series  variation  in 
measures of competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Does increased competition increase or decrease firm R&D? According to 
Schumpeter (1934) the monopoly deadweight loss is the price we have to 
pay in order to stimulate firms to perform R&D. Moreover, R&D is a major 
factor  driving  technological  change  and  economic  growth.  Therefore,  if 
Schumpeter’s proposition holds, increased competition leads to less R&D 
and a lower rate of innovation and economic growth. The Schumpeterian 
argument is that uncertainty and competition reduces the expected pay-off 
from an investment in R&D and therefore contract firm R&D. This rather 
strong  prediction  has  triggered  a  number  of  theoretical  papers  that  in 
contrast  to  Schumpeter’s  view  have  shown  that  increased  competition 
stimulates  innovation  and  R&D.  For  example:  Given  perfect 
appropriability,  Fellner  (1951)  and  Arrow  (1962)  have  shown  that  an 
innovating firm benefits more from an innovation if competition is strong. 
Scherer (1980) argues that lack of competition leads to bureaucratic inertia 
that discourages innovation. Porter (1990) states that competition is good 
for growth, because it forces firms to innovate in order to stay in business. 
In  an  important  paper,  Aghion  and  Howitt,  (1992)  showed  within  a 
Schumpeterian based endogenous growth framework, how it is possible to 
establish a negative correlation between competition and R&D.
1 In 1999, 
they proceeded and showed how various changes within the set-up of their 
1992-model may reverse the predicted negative impact of competition on 
R&D and growth. For example, if managers are not profit maximizing but 
rather just want to stay in business with as little effort as possible, increased 
competition  will  force  managers  to  move  the  firm  closer  to  the 
technological  frontier,  and  as  a  result,  R&D  will  increase.  That  is,  an 
agency  problem.  Another  mechanism  that  gives  rise  to  a  positive 
correlation  between  competition  and  R&D  is  the  degree  of  neck-and-
neckness in an industry. If an industry is characterized by neck-to-neck 
firms with similar technology, the gain due to an innovation is high. This is 
because instead of sharing the technological lead with its competitors, the 
firm will now be the single front technology firm. Hence, more product 
market competition boost firm R&D. 
In  the,  Aghion  et  al.  (2004)  model,  both  the  positive  and  negative 
impacts of competition on R&D are built into a single model which in turn 
yields an  inverted  U-shaped  relation between  competition  and  R&D.  In 
addition, Aghion et al. (2004) show that the positive impact of competition 
                                                            
1 Schumpeter made a distinction between actual and anticipated monopoly power. For a 
discussion of this issue, see e.g. Geroski (1990).   3 
on R&D (escape competition effect) is strongest in leveled neck-to-neck 
industries. 
In  empirical  analyses,  the  evidence  on  the  impact  of  competition  on 
R&D is mixed. An early study on this topic is Horowitz (1962) who found 
that  competition  contracts  R&D.  Other  studies  that  find  a  negative 
correlation between competition and R&D are Hamberg (1964), Mansfield 
(1968), Kraft (1989), Crépon et al. (1998)
2 and Blundell et al. (1999).  
In contrast to studies that find a negative correlation between R&D and 
competition there are studies that find a positive correlation. Examples are 
Mukhopadhyay (1985), Geroski (1990), Blundell et al. (1995)
3 and Nickell 
(1996).  Because  of  these  contradicting  results  one  may  suspect  an 
underlying non-linear relation. Indeed, Sherer (1967) found evidence for an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and R&D. Evidence 
for an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and R&D has 
also been detected by Scott (1984), Levin et al. (1985) and Aghion et al. 
(2004).  
We  test  whether  predictions  of  the  Aghion  et  al.  (2004)  model  are 
supported by data. More specifically, ask whether there is an inverted U-
shaped relation between competition and R&D and if the positive escape 
competition effect of competition on R&D increases with respect to the 
degree of neck-to-neckness. In addition we analyze robustness of results 
with respect to the use of different estimators and measures of competition. 
To  achieve  this  we  use  Swedish  firm  level  data  covering  the  Swedish 
manufacturing industry spanning the period 1990 - 2000.  
Results are sensitive with respect to choice of measure of competition. 
The inverted U-shaped relation is supported by the Herfindahl index, (H) 
but not by the price cost margin, (PCM). Using the Herfindahl index results 
suggest that breaking up monopolies increases R&D while further increases 
in  competition  most  likely  leads  to  reduced  R&D.  Comparing  different 
estimators we find that time-series based estimators typically result in less 
clear-cut results, probably due to a lack of time series variation in measures 
of competition. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 gives a short overview of 
related  research.  Data,  variables,  theoretical  predictions  and  estimation 
issues are discussed in section 3; Section 4 contains the econometric results 
and section 5 concludes.  
                                                            
2 The main goal of the Crépon et al. study is not to study competition and R&D but 
rather to link R&D, innovation and productivity. 
3 Blundell et al. find that dominant firms innovate more than non-dominant firms while 
industry concentration dampens innovative activity.   4 
2. Related literature 
 
As firm level data has become increasingly available, the subject of study 
has gradually changed from the industry to the firm. Despite the change of 
unit  of  observation  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  shape  of  the  relation 
between competition and R&D. Below we survey a number of studies on 
competition  and  R&D  sorted  with  respect  to  method  of  estimation  and 
measure  of  competition.  This  may  reveal  whether  there  is  a  systematic 
relation  between  results  and  the  choice  of  estimator/measure  of 
competition. 
Nickell (1996), Aghion et al. (2004) and Mulkay et al. (2004) all use 
fixed effects, GMM or first differenced OLS, or a combination of these 
estimators on US, UK and French firms. These estimators typically wash 
out  fixed  effects  and  uses  time  series  information  only.  Despite  this 
similarity,  results  do  not point  in  the  same  direction.  Nickell  finds that 
increased  concentration  increases  productivity  growth  in  UK-based 
companies, Aghion et al. (2004) find robust evidence for an inverted U-
shaped relation between product market competition and innovation in a 
sample of 330 UK firms, while Mulkay et al. find that profits boost R&D 
in US firms but find no significant impact on French firms.  
If  differences  in  results  not  are  driven  by  choice  of  estimator,  the 
measure of competition may play a role. A commonly used measure of 
competition is the degree of market concentration measured as the market 
share held by the three or four largest firms in an industry. Studies that use 
market concentration as measure of competition do not all come up with 
similar conclusions. For example, Kraft (1989) in a study of innovation by 
West German firms find that increased market concentration boosts firm 
R&D.  Crépon  et  al.  (1998),  apply  a  Tobit  analysis  and  discrete  choice 
models  on  French  manufacturing  firms  and  find  that  increased  market 
shares both increase the probability that a firm performs R&D, and for 
R&D performers, boost R&D.
4 Slightly weaker conclusions are drawn by 
Mansfield (1983). Mansfield applies the change in market concentration on 
industry innovation and concludes that an increased rate of technological 
change  often  is  associated  with  increased  competition.  Geroski  (1990), 
using both Tobit as well as OLS models on 4 378 innovations in the UK 
find no support for the hypothesis that competition is bad for innovation 
and  growth.  Blundell  et  al.  (1995)  apply  the  degree  of  market 
concentration. Using firm level data on innovation in UK firms, they find 
                                                            
4  The  main  purpose  of  the  Crépon  et  al.  study  is  not  to  analyze  the  impact  of 
competition on R&D but rather to link R&D, innovation and productivity.   5 
that dominant firms tend to innovate more than non-dominant firms while 
increased  market  competition  at  the  same  time  dampens  innovative 
activity.  In  a  classical  study  on  industry-level  R&D  and  market 
concentrations, Sherer (1967) detects an inverse U-shaped relation between 
market concentration and R&D.  
The uncertainty in R&D, firm survival and the degree of price volatility 
are closely related to the incentive to perform R&D. Anglemar (1985) finds 
that the impact of market competition on R&D crucially depends on the 
level  of  uncertainty  in  R&D  and  how  difficult  it  is  to  imitate  a  new 
technology. To be precise, Anglemar finds that if the uncertainty in R&D is 
low and imitation is difficult, increased market concentration leads to less 
R&D (and vice versa). In an analysis of West German manufacturing firms, 
Smolny (2003) associates low price volatility with low competition. Using 
a  Tobit  analysis,  he  draws  the  conclusion  that  market  power  promotes 
innovation. 
With these diverging results it seems plausible that a study of the impact 
of competition on R&D benefit from using more than one estimator and 
one measure of competition. Such an approach reveals the robustness of 
results and more reliable conclusions can be drawn. 
 
 
3. Theoretical predictions, variables and 
econometric issues    
 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  is  no  explicit  theoretical  model 
comprehensive  and  rich  enough  to  embody  all  of  the  effects/variables, 
which we believe to be relevant in determining firm-level R&D and which 
have been used for that purpose in the empirical literature. However, the 
Schumpeterian model has proved to be flexible and has been extended in 
various directions. We test predictions of the Aghion et al. (2004) model. 
Aghion  et  al.  (2004)  use  a  Schumpeterian  framework  and  derive  an 
inverted U-shaped relation between competition and R&D. The mechanism 
behind this curve is the following: firms compare the expected profit of pre 
and post-innovation rents. If competition decreases, pre-innovation rents 
less than post-innovation rents, increased competition fosters innovation. 
Hence,  if  competition  increases,  firms  might  escape  competition  by 
innovating. However, if competition is fierce the negative Schumpeterian 
effect of competition on R&D dominates the positive escape competition 
effect. Put together, these two contradicting forces give rise to an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between competition and R&D.   6 
In addition, the positive effect of competition on innovation and R&D is 
strongest  in  leveled  industries  characterized  by  neck-to-neck  firms  with 
similar technological level and unit costs. The intuition is that in leveled 
industries, an incremental increase in productivity helps the firm to reap 
market  shares  from  a  large  number  of  competitors.  Hence  in  leveled 
industries the positive escape competition effect of competition on R&D is 
stronger (steeper) than in unleveled industries. Finally, the model predicts 
that the expected technology gap in an industry increases with the degree of 
competition.
5 
The theoretical model is intuitive and straightforward but rather complex 
to solve analytically. Typically, no closed-form solution is reachable and 
one has to rely on numerical solutions and simulations, we therefore focus 







The central variable of the Aghion et al. (2004) model is innovation. To 
proxy innovation, researchers typically use data on: patent, R&D spending 
or  productivity.  At  a  first  glance  patent  data  might  be  an  appropriate 
measure.  However,  the  patenting  propensity  varies  enormously  across 
firms and industries. In some industries the patenting procedure might be 
even longer than the economic payoff of an innovation. Some firms may 
both innovate and perform relatively much R&D without that shows up in 
the patent statistics. Therefore, patent data might be more appropriate in an 
analysis  on  a  limited  number  of  industries.  Productivity  growth  is  an 
alternative output measure of innovation. In practice, productivity growth is 
not  only  related  to  innovation  but  also  to  investments  and  embodied 
technological  change  (Stoneman,  1983).  Moreover,  given  imperfect 
competition, commonly used measures of TFP are biased.
7 Therefore, our 
preferred measure of innovation is R&D expenditures.
8  
 
                                                            
5 Since we build on a well-known model, the description is kept brief. See Aghion and 
Howitt (2004) for details. 
6 This approach is also taken by Aghion et al. (2004). 
7 See e.g., Klette and Griliches (1996) and Klette (1999). 
8 R&D can be seen as an input in the innovation process where innovations and patents 
are the output. Increased input –R&D- is therefore expected to give rise to increased 
output, that is, innovations.    7 
Competition 
Competition is a non-monetary concept which makes it hard to measure. 
We apply two measures of competition – one at the industry and one at the 
firm level reflecting the degree of competition from different perspectives, 
thus allowing us to evaluate the robustness of the association between R&D 
and competition. Our first measure of competition is the Herfindahl index 
(H). More competitors and/or more equally distributed market shares result 
in a lower value of the Herfindahl index, indicating increased competition. 
The Herfindahl index is more appropriate for large economies (where the 
domestic market is the main market) than it is for small economies and 
small markets.
9  
As an alternative and as a robustness test we use the price cost margin, 
(PCM). The PCM measure the mark-up that firms charge. A low degree of 
product  market  competition  results  in  high  mark-ups.  Contrary  to  the 
Herfindahl index, changes in PCM are directly related to the firms pricing 
behavior.
10  It  is  not  a  trivial  matter  to  decide  on  the  proper  level  of 
aggregation for the PCM. On the one hand, competition is easily thought of 
as an industry property. On the other hand, two firms active in the same 
industry might produce products that do not compete in the same market. 
Firms often try to create their own segment to profile their product and 
escape competition. Therefore, we apply the PCM at the firm level. 
An  issue  not  often  discussed  in  the  context  of  the  measurement  of 
competition  is  globalization.  For  many  firms,  the  final  good  market  is 
located in both the home country and abroad while the R&D activity may 
be  concentrated  to  one  country.  Hence, competition  on  foreign  markets 
may affect the amount of R&D performed in the home market. Therefore, 
if firms are unable to segment markets, the price cost margin might be 
preferable to the Herfindahl index. This is because the PCM might be a 
function of not only the degree of competition in the home market but also 
of competition on foreign markets.  
Variation  in  the  measured  level  of  competition  may  a  have  different 
interpretation in the cross-sectional and time-series dimension. In the cross-
section, a high PCM (or Herfindahl index) might be the outcome of scale 
effects or lack of competition, or a combination of these. In the time series 
dimension we can ignore scale-effects and fixed factors that affect firm 
R&D. A new entrant in an industry – implying a decreasing scale of the 
Herfindahl index - will only be related to the measured level of competition 
in the same industry at a specific point in time. Therefore, in the time series 
                                                            
9 For example, the US competition authorities use the Herfindahl index as a guideline 
for making decisions on approving mergers and acquisitions, see e.g. FTC (1995). 
10 For a survey of the theory of oligopoly, competition and price, see e.g. Weiss (1989).   8 
dimension the dynamics of competition variables has a clear interpretation. 
However, this comes at a price. First, we lose potentially valuable cross-
sectional information. Second, Davies and Geroski (1997) point out that 
even if individual firms’ market shares vary over time and competition is 
fierce, industry based measures of competition might be rather stable. This 
leads  to  low  time-series  variation  in  data,  large  standard  errors  and 
potentially an under-evaluation of competition. As expected, our measures 
of competition have a larger cross sectional than time (within) variation.
11  
It  is  well  known  that  the  PCM  may  be  endogenous.  Tybout  (2003) 
discuss the impact of import competition and the return on capital on firms’ 
pricing behavior. In addition, Clarke and Davies (1982), analyze how the 
Herfindahl  index  and  PCM  are  related  to  efficiency  differences  among 





Firms  do  not  rely  on  internally  generated  technology  only,  outside 
technology is also important. In this context, the importance of technology 
spillovers  as  a  vehicle  for  innovation  and  productivity  growth  becomes 
clear.  In  a  classical  paper,  Griliches  (1992)  points  at  substantive  and 
significant  spillovers  associated  with  trade.
13  We  analyse  imported 
technology spillovers using R&D weighted I/O spillovers.
14  
Spillovers  may  not  only  stem  from  import,  domestic  conditions  also 
matters. A firm distant from the technology frontier may have more outside 
information to absorb than the leading-edge firm. We capture this type of 
spillover by means of a technology transfer (technology gap) parameter, 
mt gap A ) ( −  indicating the distance to the technology frontier.
15 
 
The escape competition effect and neck-to-neckness 
The Aghion et al. (2004) model predict that the escape competition effect is 
strongest in leveled industries. That is, increasing competition is expected 
to boost R&D by most in leveled industries. We test this hypothesis by 
                                                            
11 Herfindahl index; σbe = 2556,  σw = 1756. PCM;  σbe = 0.92,  σw = 0.35. 
12 We instrument PCM with industry import penetration, capital intensity, Herfindahl 
index, TFP, fixed industry effects and period dummies. 
13 Wolfgang Keller, in an array of papers (see e.g. Keller 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b), 
has studied both national and international technology spillovers. In line with Griliches 
(1992) he finds strong support for the existence of technology spillovers. 
14 For a similar approach, see e.g. Coe and Helpman (1995). For details on variable 
construction, see Appendix.  
15 For a similar approach, see e.g. Van Reenen et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2004). 
For details on variable construction, see Appendix.   9 
including an interaction between the intra-industry technology gap and the 




The perhaps most well-studied variables causing firm R&D is firm size. 
Decades of empirical research on the relationship between firm size and 
R&D have established a number of empirical patterns. Although some of 
these patterns have been subject to controversy, economists have arrived at 
a consensus view of an elasticity of R&D with respect to firm size close to 
unity. We measure firm size as relative employment of the ith firm to the 
industry  average  and  test  if  proportionality  can  be  rejected  or  not  (see 




The importance of human capital in the innovation process is stressed in 
the endogenous growth theory.
17 In the Aghion et al. (2004) model, labor is 
homogenous and each firm chooses its allocation of labor to maximize the 
current value of profits. However, it is plausible to argue that total firm 
R&D also depends on the skill composition of the labor force. To control 
for firms’ skill composition we include the wage share to skilled workers 
(workers with at least post secondary education). An econometric issue is 
the direction of causality; does firms’ R&D depend on their human capital 
abundance or vice versa? We tackle possible endogeneity by way of an 
instrumental variable approach
18 using lagged values of the firms’ wage 
share  to  skilled  workers  as  well  as  industry-  and  time  dummies  as 
instruments. In addition, the skill composition may be dependent on the 
level of competition. Including the human capital variable does not allow 
the  impact  of  competition  on  R&D  to  incorporate  human-capital 
adjustments. As a robustness test we re-estimate the model excluding the 
human-capital variable, thus, allowing changes in competition to pass over 
to the R&D expenditures through adjustments of the workforce. 
 
 
                                                            
16 Relating competition to firm size may incur a spurious relationship. We adjust for 
endogeniety using a set of lagged values of firm size, industry- and time dummies as 
instruments. 
17  See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). 
18 In Sweden, approximately 21% percent of workers with post-secondary education 
within  the  manufacturing  industry  are  involved  in  R&D-related  work,  (Statistics 
Sweden, (2001)).   10
Industry dummies 
Technological  opportunity  is  about  the  possibility  of  converting  an 
innovation  to  a  new  enhanced  product  or  production  process.  Many 
researchers have realised the importance of this concept while still lacking 
a clear and precise understanding of how to conceptualise and measure it. 
Geroski (1991b) argues that industries in the early phase of the product 
cycle may be characterised by high rates of innovation and a high level of 
technological opportunity which stimulates R&D. We lack a precise tool 
for  describing  the  product  cycle  and  follow  Geroski  (1990)  in  treating 




For  many  firms,  the  cost  of  performing  R&D  is  substantial  and  the 
possibility to collect risk capital is crucial in financing R&D projects. One 
may  argue  that  public  firms  face  fewer  obstacles  than  private  ones  in 
collecting  such  capital  and  controlling  ownership  may  therefore  be 
important. Moreover, studies of multinational firms show that most of their 
innovative  activity  tends  to  be  performed  in  the  home  country  see  e.g. 
Cantwell (1992). To capture the impact of ownership we include a “public-
owned” and a “foreign-owned” dummy. 
 
To test implications of the Aghion et al. (2004) model we specify a semi-
loglinear relationship between firm R&D and the independent variables. 
The estimated baseline specification takes the form: 
 
) σ iid(0, ~ ε ; ε D β D β
(Size) β ) log(r β ) gap (A β ) log(wH β









s mt 4 s imt 3 imt 2
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+ + +
+ + − + +
+ + + =
− −   (3.1) 
 
where  wH is the wage share to skilled workers in firm i in industry m at 
time t,  gap A −  is the distance to the technological leader, 
F r  is imported 
technology spillovers, Size is relative employment to the industry average, 
ownership  is  captured  by  a  private  and  a  foreign  ownership  dummy, 
competition is captured by the Herfindahlindex and the price cost margin 
and ε is the classical error term. 
 
                                                            
19 Similarly, we lack patent statistics and therefore treat the appropriability conditions as 
an unobservable characteristic captured by industry-/fixed effects.    11
3.2 Data 
 
Data  are  obtained  from  Statistics  Sweden,  Financial  Statistics  (FS)  and 
Regional Labour Statistics (RAMS). These datasets contain information on 
all manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees, spanning the period 
1990 to 2000. RAMS mainly contain information on employees’ level of 
education and wages while FS contain information about firms’ inputs and 
outputs.  
Data on the R&D variable stem from the Financial Statistics (FS) and 
cover all firms with at least one employee active in R&D activities at a 
minimum  of  50%  of  full  time.  The  FS  is  retrieved  annually  and  it  is 
compulsory  for  firms  to  reply.  Respondents  are  asked  to  give  an  exact 
figure for R&D expenditure or to answer in an interval scale.
20  
R&D is not evenly distributed across industries. Table 1 reveals that the 
most R&D intensive industry (communication) spent 50 percent of valued 
added on R&D in 1999 while the corresponding number for “publishers 
and printers” was only 0.2 percent. Obviously, the importance and impact 
of  a  policy  intended  to  affect  firm  R&D  may  be  very  different  across 
industries. 
 
 Table 1: R&D intensities by industry (in percentages), 1999. 
Note: SNI 92 correspond to the ISIC rev(3) standard of classification. 
                                                            
20 An alternative to the FS R&D data is the bi-annually collected Research Statistics 
(RS), based on all firms within the FS with at least 200 employees and on a sample of 
firms with 50 – 200 employees, given that theses firms report R&D expenditures of at 
least 200 000 SEK to the FS. In the context of statistical reliability, the bi-annually 
collected Research Statistics is of higher quality but has less coverage. The RS and FS 
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Total number of observations,  (firms with R&D>0) 2258   12
4. Results  
 
In  Table  2  we  present  results  ignoring  any  potential  non-linearity  in 
competition and in Figure 1 we depict results from regressions allowing for 
a  non-linear  relation  between  competition  and  R&D  using  different 
estimators and measures of competition. In Tables 3 and 4 we proceeds by 
analyzing whether the escape competition effect is strongest is in leveled 
industries  and  perform  a  sensitivity  analysis  of  results  with  respect  to 
inclusion/exclusion of human capital variables and instrumental variables.
21  
Results  in  Table  2  indicate  that  competition  tends  to  contract  R&D, 
supporting the classical Schumpeterian view.
22 This result is robust with 
respect  to  the  inclusion/exclusion  of  fixed  industry  effects,  spillover 
variables and choice of estimator. To explore whether an inverted U-shaped 
relation is present, we proceed and apply a second order polynomial of the 
competition  variables and two  measures  of  competition.  The  results are 
depicted in Figure 1.
23  
Focusing  on  the  Herfindahl  index,  results  in  Figure  1  supports  the 
hypothesis  of  an  inverted  U-shaped  relation  between  competition  and 
innovation. However, replacing the Herfindahl index for the PCM yields a 
negative relation between competition and R&D. Hence, using the PCM 
only  the  Schumpeterian  effect  is  detected,  while  the  positive  escape 
competition effect vanishes. Moreover, using the fixed effect estimator the 
relation between competition and R&D becomes insignificant. The reduced 
significance  is  probably  driven  by  low  time-series  variation  in  our 
measures of competition. Hence, results are in line with arguments made by 
Davies and Geroski (1997). 
The difference in results using the Herfindahl index and the PCM may 
be  driven  by  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  starting  from  a  low  level  of 
competition  a  decreasing  Herfindahl  index  ex  ante  suggests  increased 
competition, and a firm might escape competition by increasing its R&D. 
However,  a  reduced  PCM  indicates  an  ex  post,  realized  reaction  of 
competition. One may therefore argue that a realized change in the price 
cost  margin  immediately  takes  the  firm  to  the  segment  where  the 
Schumpetarian  effect  dominates.  As  seen  in  Figure  1,  the  escape 
competition effect only dominates the Herfindahl index at low levels of 
competition (Herf > 4200), that is, in monopoly-duopoly industries. 
 
 
                                                            
21 The instrumented variables are PCM, Size and wH. 
22 This result also holds for the Herfindahl index. 
23 For parameter estimates, see Table A3.   13
Table 2: Regression results R&D versus competition.                































Notes:  p-values  within  brackets.   
***, 
**, 




! indicate the parameter is significantly different from unity at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively, only applied on the size variable. 
A  We allow for a first order panel specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
B  After adjusting for endogeneity, Wu-Hausman tests indicate that we continue to have a minor problem 
of endogeneity. 
 
Switching from the 2SLS estimator to the fixed effect estimator similar 
curves appears but all significance vanishes. Hence, results depend on what 
measure  of  competition  we  choose  and  the  significance  is  affected  by 
choice of estimator.
24 
The PCM may be influenced not only by domestic producers but also by 
the  degree  of  competition  from  foreign  producers  and  competition  on 
foreign  markets  while  the  Herfindahl  index  only  takes  the  number  of 
domestic producers and the distribution of market shares among these into 
account. To add control for the impact of import competition when using 
the Herfindahlindex we in model 8 (Table 3) complement the estimation 
                                                            
24 Aggregating the PCM to the industry level yields similar curvature as for the firm 
level and a drop in significance. 
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with  the  degree  of  industry  import  penetration.  Results  show  that  the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the Herfindahl index and R&D is 
stable irrespective of whether we take import competition into account or 
not. The estimated impact of industry import penetration is negative and 
significant  at  the  10  percent  level  of  significance  indicating  that 
competition  from  abroad  contract  firm  R&D.  That  is,  the  traditional 
Schumpeterian effect of competition on innovation dominates. 
 
Figure 1: The estimated relation Competition versus R&D. 



































Note: The figures are derived from second order specifications of the 2SLS and FE-
model  specifications  in  models  4  and  5  in  Table  2  respectively,  see  Appendix  for 
parameter estimates. 
 
The Aghion et al. (2004) model suggests a complementarity between the 
degree  of  neck-and-neckness  and  competition.  The  positive  escape 
competition effect is supposed to boost R&D by most when firms compete 
neck-to-neck.  We  test  this  proposition  by  fixing  the  regressions  to  the 
interval where the technology gap is below the average, i.e. where firms are 
close to each other in the technology space. In support of the model, using   15
the Herfindahl index, the inverse U-shaped relation is sharpened
25. Both the 
first and second order polynomial coefficient increase in absolute value. In 
addition,  as  a  direct  test  of  complementarity,  in  models  10  and  15  we 
append an interaction between competition and the degree of neck-and-
neckness. Results point in the same direction. Using the Herfindahl index 
we find support for a positive interaction between competition and neck-
and-neckness on R&D. However, when using the PCM we do not find any 
support for complementarities. 
 
Table 3: The escape competition effect and human capital. 
Competition measure - Herfindahl index. 
q Neck-and-neckness competition is defined when A-gap < 2.26 (The mean value of Technology gap).  
Notes:  p-values  within  brackets.   
***, 
**, 




! indicate the parameter is significantly different from unity at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively (only applied on the log(σ) variable). 
A  We allow for a first order panel specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
                                                            
25 Test of coefficients of H and H
2 between neck-to -neckness specifications and full 
models indicate insignificant differences at the 5 percent level. 

























































































































































































































2 adjusted  0.68  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.96 
Observations  6246  5108  5022  4226  4226   16
A  third  prediction  of  the  model  is  that  the  expected  technology  gap 
increases with competition. This suggests a negative correlation between 
the  technology  gap  and  the  degree  of  competition.  This  hypothesis  is 
supported by both competition variables.
26 
 
Table  4:  The  escape  competition  effect  and  human  capital. 
Competition measure - price cost margin. 
q Neck-and-neckness competition is defined when A-gap < 2.26 (The mean value of Technology gap).  
Notes:  p-values  within  brackets.   
***, 
**, 




! indicate the parameter is significantly different from unity at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively (only applied on the log(σ) variable). 
A  We allow for a first order panel specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
 
There are of course other variables than competition that cause R&D 
investments. One of the most classical ones, stemming from Schumpeter’s 
earlier work in the 1940s is firm size. In line with the vast majority of work 
in this field we find the average R&D elasticity with respect to firm size to 
be close to unity (0.9-1.3). However, using the fixed effect estimator the 
                                                            
26 See the Correlation matrix, Appendix. 






























































































































































































2 adjusted  0.69  0.96  0.95  0.96  0.96 
Observations  5164  4361  4361  3481  3481   17
estimate drops to 0.40.
27 Hence, no strong scale effect in R&D is detected 
and we note that results may alter depending on choice of estimator. 
The  most  central  component  in  the  innovation  process  is  human 
capital.
28 Analyzing the impact of firms’ skill composition on R&D we find 
that the wage share of skilled workers is a highly significant determinant of 
R&D. The estimated elasticity is slightly above unity indicating that human 
capital-intensive firms perform relatively much R&D.
29 Because wages to 
R&D  personnel  are  included  in  the  R&D  expenditures  we  use  an 
instrumental variable approach. Results are significant and insensitive to 
choice of IV-matrix indicating a robust relation between human capital and 
firm R&D.  
In  models 7  and 13  we  exclude the  human  capital  variable  from the 
analysis. By excluding this variable we allow for the indirect impact of 
competition on the allocation of human capital to pass over to R&D. This is 
a less restrictive model formulation. Excluding the human capital variable 
does not change the results.  
It  is  well  documented  that  outside  knowledge  contributes  to  firms’ 
knowledge  stock.  One  channel  for  outside  knowledge  to  reach  firms 
knowledge stock is through knowledge spillovers. Spillovers may follow 
many paths; some are related to international trade flows and input-output 
linkages while others may be domestic horizontal spillovers. Accordingly, 
we distinguish between local and international spillovers. For each firm, we 
analyze domestic spillovers using the technology gap to the technological 
leader  in  the  industry.  The  technology  gap  measure  is  positive  and 
significant  in  most  of  the  regressions.  The  conclusion  is  that  due  to 
horizontal domestic spillovers, laggards tend to undertake more R&D than 
what would have been the case in the absence of such spillovers.  
R&D investments are not only affected by local spillovers, international 
spillovers also matters. We capture international trade related spillovers by 
filtering  R&D  weighted  imports  through  the  I/O-matrix.  International 
spillovers are positive and significant in all specifications irrespective of 
choice of estimator. Results point at an estimated elasticity in the interval 
of 0.3-0.7, indicating the existence of substantial spillovers from abroad. 
Hence,  results  indicate  that  foreign  knowledge  may  be  particularly 
important  for  a  small  economy  where  the  domestic  knowledge  stock  is 
small relatively to the world knowledge stock. Significant, trade related 
knowledge  spillovers  are  also  found  by  e.g.  Coe  Helpman  (1995)  and 
Keller (2000, 2002b). 
                                                            
27 0.45 when using the Herfindahl index. 
28  See e.g. Aghion & Howitt 1999. 
29 The 2SLS estimated elasticity span the interval 1.03-1.31.   18
Firm ownership may affect the possibility of funding R&D. In a policy 
sense  it  is  important  to  analyze  whether  publicly-owned  firms  cet. par. 
spend more on research than privately owned firms. Results do not reveal 
any  differences  between  publicly-  and  privately-owned  firms.  Finally, 
studies of multinational- and foreign-owned firms have pointed out that, for 
many  firms,  most  of  the  innovative  activity  is  performed  in  the  home 
country. However, results indicate that, if anything, foreign-owned firms 
spend  more  on  R&D  than  domestic  ones.  This  might  be  taken  as  an 
indication of Sweden having a comparative advantage in R&D and human 
capital-intensive production. Similar results are obtained in Gustavsson and 
Kokko (2003) and ITPS (2004).  
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
There  is  no  consensus  on  how  competition  affect  firm  R&D.  Different 
studies comes to diverging results. One may therefore suspect a non-linear 
relation between competition and R&D. Under fairly general conditions, 
Aghion et al. (2004) derive a Schumpetarian model where an inverted U-
shaped  relation  is  one  of  the  major  predictions.  Secondly,  the  model 
predicts that the positive escape competition effect of competition on R&D 
is strongest in leveled industries. That is, where firms’ technology and unit 
costs are similar to each other. Thirdly, the model predicts that the expected 
technology gap within an industry increases with competition. Using firm 
level  data  we  test  predictions  of  the  Aghion  et  al  and  investigate  the 
robustness of the relation between competition and R&D taking different 
estimators and measurers of competition into account.  
Results reveal a complex relation between measures of competition and 
R&D. Using the Herfindahl index we find strong support for the Aghion et 
al.  (2004)  model.  A  significant  inverted  U-shaped  relation  between 
competition  and  R&D  is  detected.  In  addition,  the  inverse  U-shaped 
relationship  between  competition  and  R&D  investments  is  robust  with 
respect  to  the  inclusion/exclusion  of  other  variables.  We  also  find  the 
positive escape competition effect of competition on R&D to be strongest 
in leveled industries. Finally, the model points at, as expected, a positive 
correlation  between  the  technology  gap  in  an  industry  and  the  level  of 
competition. Hence, at a first glance the Aghion et al. model stands up well 
when confronted with data. 
However, if the Herfindahl is replaced by the price cost margin, results 
break down. First, no positive effect of competition on R&D is detected, 
only  the  negative  Schumpeterian  effect  survives.  Secondly,  no  positive   19
interaction effect of the degree of neck-and-neckness and competition on 
R&D  detected.  Third,  as  for  the  Herfindahl  index,  using  fixed  effect 
estimators,  the  effect  of  competition  on  R&D  typically  becomes 
insignificant. The reduced significance support arguments made by Davies 
and Geroski (1997). Davies and Geroski argue that despite a relatively high 
within-industry  turbulence  of  firm  exit  and  market  shares,  aggregate 
measures of concentration and competition may be fairly stable over time. 
Hence, in the time series dimension there is not much information so that 
one gets large standard errors and insignificant estimates. 
There  may  be  several  explanations  why  results  differ  depending  on 
choice of estimator. One reason may be measurement errors. There may 
also be fundamental differences between the Herfindahl index and the price 
cost margin. Given non-segmented markets the price cost margin may be 
affected by competition from both domestic- and foreign-based producers 
while the Herfindahl index is only determined by the number of domestic 
competitors and the distribution of market shares. In addition, changes in 
the Herfindahl index are closely related to an ex ante expected and not 
necessarily realized change in competition. A change in a firms’ PCM, on 
the  other  hand,  is  an  ex  post  realized  reaction  to  changes  in  the 
environment.  Hence,  a  decrease  in  the  PCM  is  a  stronger  indication  of 
increased  competition than  a decreasing Herfindahl index.  Initially,  true 
competition that is unobserved may increase a certain amount before firms’ 
adjust their PCM. Therefore, a decreased PCM may immediately bring the 
firm  to  the  segment  where  the  negative  Schumpeterian  effect  of 
competition  on  R&D  dominates  the  positive  escape  competition  effect. 
Further, both in this analysis and the analysis made by Aghion et al. the 
escape competition effect dominates the negative Schumpeterian effect at 
very low levels of competition only. Results indicate that only breaking up 
monopolies leads to increased R&D. If competition is moderate or higher, 
results suggest that increased competition most likely decreases firm R&D. 
Hence,  the  positive effect of  competition  on  R&D  is  most  likely  to  be 
found in industries with a low level of competition.  
To evaluate the generality of these results it would be interesting to see if 
similar patterns as found here apply for other countries. This would not 
only indicate the robustness of results but also serve as an indication of the 
degree  of  heterogeneity  across  countries  with  respect  to  the  impact  of 
competition on innovation and R&D. We therefore look forward to future 
work on this topic. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable definitions and construction 
Below we present additional descriptions of selected variables. Our choice of subscript 
is defined as follows; i = firms, t = time index, m = industry according to 3-digit SNI 
92. 
 
1. R&D: Total Research and Development expenditures
30 in 1990 constant prices. 
Source: Statistics Sweden/Research Statistics. 
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4. TFP: Total factor productivity. (measured by means of Törnqvist index
31). Source: 
Statistics Sweden/Financial Statistics. 
 
5. Technology gap, maximum TFP for the ith firms in the mth industry. Source: 










= − , where j = leading firm 
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30 R&D is an activity, which takes place on a systematic basic to increase the body of 
knowledge,  including  the  knowledge  of  people,  culture  and  society  as  well  as  the 
application of this knowledge to new areas and to develop or improve products, systems 
and methods (definition by Statistics of Sweden). 
31 See Gunnarsson and Mellander (1999)   24

















32: Share of total wage-sum to employees with post secondary education.  
Source: Statistics Sweden/Regional Labor Statistics. 
 
9. International R&D spillovers. Derived from the international I/O tables, computed at 
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Table A1: Deflators: 
Deflator  Description  Source  variables 
PPI  Aggregated producer price 
index 
SCB homepage
 i  R&D  
PRODINDEX  Disggregated producer price 
index 
SCB homepage  Output and value added 
ITPI  Disaggregated intermediate 
goods producer price index 
SCB homepage  Intermediate goods and raw 
materials 
EPI  Aggregated energy producer 
price index 
SCB homepage  Energy 
BYGGINDEX  Disaggregated construction 
producer price index 
SCB homepage  Capital stocks of buildings and 
construction 
MASINDEX  Disaggregated machinery 
producer price index 
SCB homepage  Capital stocks of machinery 
and inventory 
IMPINDEX  Disaggregated imported good 
producer price index 
SCB homepage  Imports 
KPI  Aggregated consumer price 
index 
SCB homepage  Wages 
Notes: 
i www.scb.se 
                                                            
32 The share of highly-skilled labour (with post secondary education) in R&D related 
activities equals 21% in 1999.   25
Table A2: Correlation matrix 
  log(R&D)  PCM  PCM
2  Herf  Herf
2  log(size)  log(wH)  A-gap  log(r
F)  Public  Foreign 
log(R&D)  1.00                     
PCM  0.07  1.00                   
PCM
2  0.08  -0.78  1.00                 
Herf  0.21  -0.12  0.14  1.00               
Herf
2  0.13  -0.07  0.07  0.90  1.00             
log(size)    0.54  0.07  -0.02  0.09  0.08  1.00           
log(wH)    0.55  0.12  0.02  0.16  0.09  0.11  1.00         
A-gap  0.00  -0.12  -0.04  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.05  1.00       
log(r
F)  0.35  -0.15  0.19  0.09  0.01  -0.08  0.37  -0.05  1.00     
Public  0.04  -0.06  0.09  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.05  -0.00  -0.01  1.00   
Foreign  0.15  0.05  0.02  0.02  -0.00  0.09  0.15  -0.04  0.13  -0.10  1.00 
 
 
Table A3. Sensitivity analysis, different measures of 
competition and estimators 








Estimator ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  2SLS  2SLS  FE-estimation  FE-estimation 
  PCM  Herfindahl 
index 
PCM  Herfindahl 
index 
1


























Note: The cubic 2SLS and FE-model specification corresponds to model 4 and 5 in Table 4 respectively. 
 
 
Table A4. Variance decomposition  
  Variable  Overall- stdv  Within- stdv  Between- stdv 
log(R&D)   2.11  0.70  1.94 
log(PCM)  0.32  0.13  0.30 
PCM  0.91  0.35  0.92 
Herfindahl  2896.3  1754.5  2556.2 
log(σ)  0.95  0.26  0.89 
log(δ)  0.78  0.25  0.81 
A-gap  16.4  12.5  12.9 
log(r
F)  0.91  0.07  0.93 